1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

565 main bridge between Turk and Arab. Old-fashioned Muslims
647 or cynical free-thinkers, xenophobe or professedly cosmopolitan,
661 every type was to be found in their ranks. Barely literate, persistent Turkish-speakers, backward but decorous in social habit, uniform in their travesty of European dress, too frequently corrupt and remote from all spirit of public service, they identified the body politic with their own class, contemptuous of tribe and cultivator. Ill-paid and ambitious, they could not prudently rely on merit alone; nepotism was rampant, no intrigue or appeal neglected. The civil service of 'Iraq in 1900 must, by any save contemporary Asiatic standards, rank low; yet it contained, at all levels and all times, not a few honest and high-minded men.

631 The division of Turkish provincial territory into wilayas, sanjaqs, qadhās, and nahiyas is familiar. The administrative units corresponded generally to no geographical divisions, and were often ill conceived. Changes of status and boundary and the creation of new units were not uncommon. The 'Iraq of 1900 showed, in all, four fewer sanjaqs than there were liwās in 1950, a score fewer qadhās, two score fewer nahiyas. Qadhās were graded as first, second, and third class; they differed no less in size, population, and administrative difficulties. Some were suburban, others wholly tribal, others, such as Razaza or Kuwayt, no more than nominal. Walis and Mutaṣarrifs were appointed by imperial decree, lesser administrative officials locally by the Wali. Frequent
662 repostings and dismissals reflected an uneasy underworld of intrigue and tale-bearing, and were fatal to continuity.

The Wali as the representative of the Sultan dealt with the heads of local communities, foreign consuls, and the greater tribal chiefs. The general and non-departmental administration was in his hands. He directed the municipalities, 'settled' tribal disputes which defied settlement, heard multifarious grievances, and through the Daf-
[623] tardar influenced or controlled the all-important field of land revenue. At every wilaya and subordinate headquarters sat an Administrative Council composed partly of officials, partly of elected members who included Christian and Jewish represen-
•625 tatives. The maintenance of law and order depended upon the Gendarmerie—the *Zaptié* familiar to European travellers. This force, organized and commanded on military lines, was administered by the War Office but placed at the disposal of the local Government. Ill-paid and greedy, half-equipped and unkempt and used for every purpose of escort, message-carrying, and even domestic service, the *Zaptié* yet lacked neither loyalty nor hardi-
631 hood, and did much or most to keep the administration in being.
647 Over many of the departments operating in his area, the local

1-[The Effendiss--Analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

destined to attain fame in the Second World War—remained to render invaluable help to the 'Iraqi authorities on many occasions. These willing services, and the personalities of the Air Officers Commanding,[1] were largely invisible to, and unthanked by, the 'Iraq public. The strength rose from four squadrons in 1921 to six and then eight in the period 1922 to 1926, then was reduced again to five and to four squadrons in 1928 and 1930. Their most frequent collaboration was with the Levies.

This latter force which, with changes of location and organization since its scattered early beginnings, had shown remarkable steadfastness in the dark days of 1920, took its place early in 1922 as a British-paid and British-commanded force[2] at the disposal, for all purposes helpful to the 'Iraqi authorities, of the General Officer (later Air Officer) Commanding. Late in 1922 the Levies contained three cavalry regiments, two Kurdish and one Assyrian; one Kurdish, two Assyrian and marsh-Arab infantry battalions, and an Assyrian pack-battery. The total strength of the force was some 7,500, its officers British, Arab, Assyrian, and Kurdish, its record already creditable in tribal and mountain war, and its value obvious as a relief for outgoing British garrisons in northern 'Iraq. It was unfortunate that, through differences of loyalty and character, feeling between the Assyrian element in the Levies, which became largely predominant in its later years, and the 'Iraqi authorities was never cordial. But their services to 'Iraq were in fact valuable and respected, and the economic advantage of Levy service to the Assyrian community was important.

The 'Iraq Police grew during these years into a force generally admired for their high efficiency and good morale. Everywhere under 'Iraqi executive command, assisted and inspected by Prescott and his excellent officers, they were well selected, equipped, trained, and officered; and though crime might still occur almost unchecked in outlying tribes, the Police assumed the duties of the old Shabana, penetrated more deeply than ever before into rural districts, patrolled the routes, supported administrative officials, and collaborated on active service with the military. Specially adapted forces, camel-riding or equipped with armoured cars as need dictated, were organized for desert work in the Jazira, the

[1] The commanders of British forces in 'Iraq from 1922, when Royal Air Force was substituted for Army command, until the Second World War were: Air Vice-Marshals Sir J. Salmond, 1922; Sir F. A. Higgins, 1925; Sir E. L. Ellington, 1927; Sir R. Brooke-Popham, 1929; E. R. Ludlow-Hewitt, 1931; C. S. Burnett, 1933; W. G. S. Mitchell, 1935; C. L. Courtney, 1937; J. H. S. Tyssen, 1939; H. G. Smart, 1940.

[2] Successive commanders of the Levies, from their first organization as a single formation, were: Major C. A. Boyle, 1920; Colonel-Commandant G. R. Frith, 1921; Brigadier-General L. W. de V. Sadleir-Jackson, 1921; Colonel H. T. Dobbin, 1922; Brigadier J. G. Browne, 1926.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Dulaym, and the southern Desert. At Police headquarters, control of the specialized departments of criminal and 'special' investigation, of finger-prints, passports, and training passed in these years from British into 'Iraqi hands. The Police strength, less than 3,000 early in 1921, was to exceed 8,000 ten years later: during the same period British police officers were reduced from twenty-two to twelve, 'Iraqi officers increased from two to sixty. Great progress was made in the Department of Civil Jails where, under all-'Iraqi management after 1923, prison industries were developed.

The urban life of 'Iraq, which in these years was taking its modern form and showing its differences of scene and atmosphere from those of the Turkish era, was sadly hampered in its development by poverty. This limited the activities both of the municipalities and of those central Government departments whose work was chiefly urban. Nevertheless, the upkeep and cleanness, the lighting and watering of streets, the maintenance of municipal offices and institutions, and the honesty and energy of Baladiya staffs, all showed a pronounced improvement on Turkish standards. The wearing of the characteristic 'Iraqi urban head-dress—the *sidara*, which superseded the Turkish fez—became universal in the towns. European dress, impeccable in 'Iraqi upper-class and professional circles, was adopted by more and more townsmen and by many tribal leaders who frequented the capital. Mosul was transformed, with its new streets, bridge, water-supply, public buildings, and gardens. Basra, extended threefold by the legacy of war-time port and base development, and now uniting the suburbs of 'Ashar, Ma'qil, and Makina, boasted new bridges, improved streets, 'Iraq's finest hospital (the Maude Memorial), and new buildings domestic and commercial. Baghdad, whose municipality ranked as a separate province in the Government hierarchy under the Amin al-'Asima (Guardian of the Capital), could show new buildings—the imposing College of Al al-Bayt, the Royal Pavilion, the Maude statue, and others. It possessed a modern fire service, hotels of Western type, adequate shops including some European, an improved water-supply system, branches of three banks—the Eastern, Ottoman, and Imperial Bank of Persia—scores of agencies for European goods, clubs both British and 'Iraqi, municipal dispensaries, a municipal Court. Its streets, however unplanned and still unpaved, were well lighted, crowded with wheeled traffic, and attempting wider alignment and cleaner upkeep; the adaptation of the old Tramway Concession of 1912 was still under debate. In the smaller municipalities, inadequate as were their resources compared with their requirements as now conceived, there were signs of new life in completed or initiated schemes of electric lighting, street clearance, bridges, town gardens, and a host of minor projects for which local pride was clamoring.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the terrain least familiar to 'Iraqi troops and most favourable to their mountain-born enemy.

The Police, with an all-'Iraqi executive element and a British inspectorate, was for long the most praised of 'Iraqi services. Developing special forces for particular areas and needs—the Southern Desert, the Railways, frontiers, and the Port—the force, some 8,000 strong in all by 1932, improved also its specialist branches and preserved a fair though not infallible level of security. In 1921 British officers, British sergeants, 'Iraqi officers and 'Iraqi inspectors had numbered respectively 22, 71, 2, and 92; ten years later the figures were 12, 5, 59, and 299. Many notorious wrong-doers—a town gang at Karbalā, Kurdish outlaws of Chamchamal—were traced and tackled, co-operation was offered with the trans-frontier Turks, increased mileages of motor roads were safely policed, and urban traffic ably handled. Prisons were by 1930 well conducted on modern lines under all-'Iraqi executive control, with flourishing prison industries and a boys' reformatory.

Another element contributory to the comparative tribal quietude of these years was the advance in road-making in hitherto inaccessible areas of marsh and mountain, and the increasing mechanization of Government forces. Yet another was the progress made towards direct Government administration, with decreased reliance on the tribal shaykhs; a significant change of policy since Occupation days. The Arms Regulations, imperfectly applied, did little to prevent the carrying of firearms, but the application of the Tribal Disputes Regulations at least helped to settle intelligently, though they could not prevent, inter-tribal quarrels. The prospect of conscription alarmed such tribesmen as were aware of it, and the Census Department, a necessary preliminary to it, did not venture to push its early operations into tribal territory. The intrigues of Baghdad statesmen with tribal leaders, to embarrass their rivals' Ministries, belong rather to the period following 1932; but the policy of the Ikhā had, even before Independence, already tended in that fatal direction. The quarrels of tribal tenants and their landlords on the Gharraf in 1928 need no such explanation, nor the lawlessness of a Ḥammar marsh-shaykh in the same year which led to his punishment and flight. Tribal raiding across the Turkish frontier was inevitable, but could be localized. The Kurdish tribes and Christian villagers immigrant from Turkey in 1926 were settled in 'Iraq without mishap, and a migration without precedent by the Kifri and Ḥawija tribes in 1928 to the Persian frontier around Mandali, seeking pasture, was quiet and bloodless. Three years later the dangerous bazaar strike—encouraged, it was said, by the Ikhā—would if successful have opened the Euphrates townships to tribal raiding; and many shaykhs felt or hoped that

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab companies. The 'Iraq Police, with diminished British participation, remained a smart and reliable service adapted well to its increasing duties. It contained, during those years, rather less than 9,000 men, including a mobile force of some 750. The Royal Air Force, which since 1932 played no part in 'Iraq's internal security in spite of occasional requests by Government to do so, maintained its own bases and training installations. Mosul and Hinaydi camps and airports and former R.A.F. landing-grounds throughout 'Iraq were handed to the 'Iraq authorities at the close of this period, and the R.A.F. began to install itself, late in 1936, at Dhibban camp by Lake Habbaniya.

Financial administration continued to show the prudence and orthodoxy with which 'Iraqi finances had been handled from the first. This was the easier since the period of depression ended with 1933, and the years following showed a relatively prosperous situation. Improvements were introduced into income-tax and land-revenue procedure and Customs administration. The currency was stable and respected. The last remnant of foreign debt was extinguished; but discussions on a new loan, to be obtained in London through Baring Bros., had up to 1937 no practical issue. The oil dead-rents first received in 1932, and later the royalties, were allotted to capital works—irrigation projects, buildings, roads—included in a programme of which the items were revised in 1931, 1935, and almost annually thereafter. A law establishing an Agricultural and Industrial Bank was passed in 1935; it commenced operations, humbly at first, in the following year.

4. BAKR ṢIDQI

The Hashimi Ministry, more forceful than any 'Iraq Government since 1932, appeared by midsummer 1935 likely to endure for a long spell of office. Yasin Pasha openly anticipated ten years of power, though, little as he esteemed democracy, he had no thought of dictatorship. The tribes were frightened, the Palace weak, the opposition outwardly subdued.

But less obvious forces were at work. The King, his own position enfeebled by his personal shortcomings and the misalliance and flight of his sister with a Rhodian hotel servant and her conversion to Christianity, was willing to see a change of Ministry and even hinted at this to Yasin through intermediaries. In the Cabinet, though a scarcely anticipated harmony reigned between Yasin and Nuri Sa'id, his Foreign Minister, the latter was at constant loggerheads with the Minister of Interior. Rashid 'Ali, indeed, gave offence by his impetuous decisions, his favouritism, and the avarice which in defiance of precedent led him, when Sayid Maḥmud the Naqib died in 1936, himself to assume the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

composed of overworked officials, could accomplish little. The Amending Law passed in 1942 to the Labour Code of 1936 began to bear fruit; it provided for improved conditions for women workers, the prohibition of child labour, paid holidays, compensation for injuries, and arbitration of labour disputes. Under the Pachachi Ministry a beginning was made with the establishment of Labour Exchanges—the more necessary as the release of workers from British military employment was already creating unemployment. A number of hopeful trade unions were organized, including those of weavers, shoe-makers, oil workers, cigarette makers, and a half-dozen less important; all were directed by organizers whom underground Communism made every effort to seduce. Committees were set up to produce standard scales of wages and conditions. The growing self-consciousness of urban workers, whose greatest concentrations were in the oil companies, railways, and Port, was shown by a 'Rights of Workmen' movement which demanded a newspaper devoted to its interests, an insurance system, and wage-arbitration boards. A railway-workers' strike in April 1945 ended only with heavy-handed suppression of strike and union alike; examples were thenceforward to be frequent of the organization of strikes among workers for political purposes with little regard to their actual grievances.

An important step, long in contemplation yet not without its dangers, was the passage of major amendments to the Liwā Administration Law; the effect was to confer greater powers on local officials and Provincial Councils, and thus to facilitate local development and improved services. A revision of the Civil Code was at the same time decided, and a delegation from Baghdad spent most of 1945 in Cairo in consultation with Egyptian jurists.

Concurrently with the departure, at the end of the war, of a number of the few surviving British officials, steps were taken to recruit from Great Britain or Egypt the new experts—technical, medical, or educational—for whom the period now opening would call. An effort, of no great forcefulness, was made to eradicate corruption from the body of officialdom. Army reform in 1945 showed good results with the forced retirement of some scores of inefficient but well-befriended officers; rearmament proceeded in aircraft, vehicles, and artillery from British stocks, though not without misunderstandings and reproaches; and a marked rise in standards of training, quartering, equipment, and service conditions was observed. The Army, well supported by the Regent, began in fact again to approach a condition in which active operations could be attempted. In the Police, which appeared to have lapsed somewhat but not tragically from their old high standards, the strength of the force was increased from 10,500 in 1939 to

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

19,000 in 1945, largely by the addition of nearly 5,000 men to the Mobile Force. In the Social services the tendency was still towards such limited development and improvement of the personnel as was feasible, though budget allotments to Education were reduced to a third, and those of the Health service to a quarter, of the funds made available for Defence.

The release of the remaining 'Amara internees in mid-1944 and at intervals in 1945 made its contribution to the resurgent political activity of the time. The fourth member of the Golden Square, Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, was handed over by the Turks and hanged in September 1945. Naji Shawkat, captured in Italy, was brought to Baghdad and began to serve his sentence; Rashid 'Āli, refused entrance into Switzerland, contrived to reach Sa'udi Arabia by way of Lebanon and there, sheltered by the traditional Arab attitude to guests seeking sanctuary, could defy demands for extradition. The activity of the Baghdad press and the multiplication of its daily sheets from five to fourteen was both effect and partial cause of the reanimation of the political scene which had well begun before 8 May 1945, the date of the armistice with Germany. The old-fashioned catch-words of 'imperialism', 'the foreigner', and 'complete independence' reappeared in a thousand bitter leading articles, the situation in Palestine and Syria gave congenial topics, and the economic frustrations of the time—and indeed all of the nation's backwardness and inequalities—were, it appeared, the fault of nothing but the sinister machinations of the British. The demand for the re-formation of political parties was heard on every side, and with it the removal of all restrictions and the early revision of the Treaty with Great Britain as being no longer compatible with 'Iraq's present status.

Communism, never extinguished in Baghdad even when outlawed in 1938, gained ground perceptibly in the later war years. Communists had supported Rashid 'Āli in 1941, but on the Nazi invasion of Russia had temporarily abandoned the anti-British for the Allied cause, and remained in the cities as a living though mainly clandestine force. One such organization was the League of 'Iraqi Communists which, catering for an educated membership, followed the lawyer Da'ud al-Ṣayigh; another, the 'Iraqi Communist Party under the Christian 'Comrade Fahad' (the Panther), alias Yusif Salman, produced the secretly-printed *al-Qa'ida* newspaper. The movement gained adherents in Kurdistan, where the proximity of the Russians in north-west Persia attracted the hopeful interest of anti-Arab nationalist students and of Aghās now learning to despair of British intervention on their behalf. It spread in Baghdad and the chief cities among the poor and thwarted (not least among the Assyrian, Armenian, and Jewish minorities),

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exchanged; and even this support had to be limited when, at the League meeting in April, the member States indicted Jordan for alleged negotiations with the Jews. The task of justifying the incorporation of the Arab remainder of Palestine into the Jordan Kingdom (a step to which in practice no alternative appeared) was difficult to reconcile with the desirability of placating Egypt. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi at the League meeting in April voted for a resolution declaring Palestine to be a 'trust territory of the whole League', and in May for another which declared Jordan's act of unification a breach of the principle thus established. He then with difficulty secured postponement of the decision to expel the Hashimite Kingdom, and succeeded in substituting a compromise formula acceptable to all save Jordan herself, asserting that Palestine should, after complete liberation, be disposed of by a collective decision of the League.

Disunity was not less evident in connexion with the Collective Security Pact proposed by Egypt in 1949. The Pact was not for many months accepted by 'Iraq, whose spokesmen saw little value in an agreement which did not include Jordan; but this clash of views, unresolved by the end of 1950, did not prevent the 'Iraqi Premier from offering his verbal support to Egypt in her current diplomatic struggle with Britain. With Israel the successive Governments in Baghdad continued to refuse all negotiation; and the Cabinet, with the implacable politicians of other States, professed to see a new threat of 'imperialism' in the would-be sedative declaration of Britain, the United States, and France on 25 May that they were opposed to the use of aggressive force by any Middle Eastern State, including Israel, and would supply thenceforward only the armaments necessary to each country's defence. The declaration was accepted by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with reserves which he was at pains to indicate to the British and American Ambassadors.

The year 1950 was peaceful in Kurdistan. There was no sign of Mullā (or Marshal) Muṣṭafā's return, though the wireless campaign from the Soviet Armenian 'Post of the Kurdish Democratic Party' persisted; and 'Iraqi policy in Kurdistan, where Nuri Sa'id in conciliatory mood toured in September 1950, seemed to show increased sympathy with its wayward Kurdish subjects, and there were less frequent schoolboy outbursts in Sulaymaniya. In the Police the former Director-General, 'Alwan Ḥusayn, had resumed command after an attempted coup (it was said) had led to the dismissal of 'Ali Khalid, and the force regained their discipline and prowess. The Army, still dissatisfied with the equipment provided for it and with the fewness of cadet vacancies made available in England, tried genuinely to improve its efficiency, sought in vain

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 has been said elsewhere to show the nature of their problems. Their own restlessness in a minority status, their antipathy to an Arab Government, their uneasy leadership by feudal Aghās or 'intellectual' townsmen towards a non-'Iraqi nationalism—or Communism—indicated that these problems remained unsolved. Still deeply disunited, the Kurds had shown no signs of evolving into a contented or strengthening element in the State; and the wider Kurdish question of their broad Turco-Perso-'Iraqi homeland had not been—probably never would be—answered on lines acceptable to the spokesmen of that race.

671 Throughout the territory a fair level of security and justice—
692 a level doubtless far higher than any seen in 'Iraq for centuries—had been achieved and prevailed in all or almost all regions. The Courts had been developed in the last five years by the institution of a Court of First Instance at every liwā headquarters and by the establishment of Appeal Courts at Baṣra, Mosul, Ḥilla, Ba'quba, and Kirkuk as well as at the capital. The Tribal Disputes Regulations remained in force, with recent amendments; a new Civil Code was passed into law in 1951 to take effect two years later, thus superseding the Majalla; a new Commercial Code was already in force. The Criminal Code drawn up in 1918 retained its authority. As a whole, the judicial system, Codes of Law, Courts, Judges, and Magistracy, gave every appearance of adequacy to 'Iraq's present needs, a goal reached by thirty years of well-directed effort. The last British Judge, Sir J. Pritchard, left 'Iraq in 1951.

625 The Police, numbering nearly 20,000 of all ranks, included
697 a mobile force of nearly 6,000 and mechanized sections. They had regained the standards temporarily lost in 1948 and were felt to be, with occasional lapses, a creditable and efficient body. The force was adequately organized, trained, and specialized for its multifarious duties in city, countryside, mountain, and desert. The level of its officers was predominantly high and sometimes admirable. The administration of the prisons was on modern and constructive lines, a world of contrast from the filth and medieval corruption of Ḥamidian times.

701 The Army, which in its lifetime of thirty years had had its good days and its bad, contained some good and some indifferent material. Its leadership was likely to be excellent in the smaller units, doubtful in the larger, and its fighting prowess would always be in strict proportion to its leadership. Its organization[1] and training establishments, and its concentration on mechanized

[1] Army service was compulsory (with statutory purchasable exemptions) for two years, followed by service in the Reserve till the age of forty-five. Voluntary service could be substituted for compulsory either during or after the initial two years, and would run thereafter in two-year terms without affecting Reserve liability.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

choice between the two alternatives was not difficult. Both the magnitude of the task and the military situation demanded immediate returns and a maximum of efficiency with a minimum of effort from those delegated to the initiation of the civil aspect of administration. None of the responsible officials of the Turkish regime remained. Few of the British officers of the Army of Occupation possessed any specialized knowledge of the previous administration. Such little administrative experience as existed had been gained in Indian systems which, from the British point of view, were vastly preferable to the inefficient and clumsy Turkish methods. In addition, the confident expectation within inner circles that the Government of India would assume the future permanent control of Basra and its hinterland at least, stimulated the adoption of the Indian administrative methods and practices which would aid in the assimilation of the occupied territories.

Within a week of the occupation of Basra, a Civil Police service modelled on Indian lines replaced the Military Police, under the supervision of Mr. E. G. Gregson of the Indian Police Service, who had had wide experience on the North West Frontier and in the Persian Gulf. Employment of the ex-Turkish police, even had they been available, was not desirable. Constables were therefore imported from India and Aden. A similar force was organized at 'Amāra, and a little later at Nāsirīya and at Sūq ash-Shuyūkh, but not with great success.[1] Local police, or *Shabana*, for use in the outlying villages and districts, were recruited from the Arabs themselves.

Foundations were thus laid on which later officials from India, including Colonel H. C. Prescott, I.A., Late Inspector-General of 'Iraq Police, were to construct the present 'Iraq Police system, in which the *Shabana* provided the nucleus of the native element.

[1] *Administration Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh*, in *Reports of Political Officers in Occupied Territories of 'Iraq*, 1916-1917 (March 31). Submitted by Sir P. Cox under No. 8850, Baghdad, November 18th, 1917 (hereafter *P.O. Reports*, 1916-17).

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of all road users as well as their passengers and cargoes. The expectation of increased road traffic makes it imperative that appropriate measures of control be devised without delay.

The following measures are suggested for adoption:

1. Construction of road weighbridges at suitable check points.
2. Compulsory inspection of all vehicles carrying passengers for payment and of all trucks before a periodic license is issued.
3. Appointment of qualified inspectors with sufficient authority and responsibility to ensure adequate enforcement of vehicle regulations.

With the development of traffic on the new highways it will be necessary to introduce and enforce proper traffic rules and regulations. The Mission, therefore, recommends that a highway code be drawn up and that traffic police be instructed and trained in the application and enforcement of the code.

Traffic conditions in the capital are at certain times of the day chaotic, even though city traffic is by no means dense. It would appear that, with training, the formidable force of traffic police now regulating the city's traffic could without expansion serve for traffic control on the country's highway system as well. It would pay the government to engage the services of a traffic expert, preferably from a metropolitan police such as London's, for a limited period, to design the highway code and to instruct the traffic police.

Public Road Transport

It will become increasingly necessary to regulate public road transport of passengers and goods by a licensing system. If this transport is left entirely free and uncontrolled, chaos will be the result; too many operators are likely to engage in public transport, run their services on borrowed money, find their vehicles run down before the loans are repaid and end in bankruptcy. The country's economy will suffer both from the waste of resources involved in such uneconomic ventures and from the probable need of protecting the railways by subsidies from the consequences of such wasteful operations. A reasonable number of capable private operators should provide healthy competition among themselves and with the railway.

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Chamber of Deputies. The deputies are elected on the basis of one to every 20,000 male Iraqi subjects. Every bill must be submitted to each Assembly in turn and then approved by the King.

The Cabinet consists of at least seven ministers, including the Prime Minister, under whose presidency it meets, and any ministers without portfolio. The Prime Minister is chosen by the King, who also appoints the other ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The ministers are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, jointly in matters which concern the ministries and severally in what concerns their respective ministries and the departments under them.

The ministries are those of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Social Affairs, Defence, Justice, Education, Economics, Communications and Works, Health and Agriculture.

Administration

Iraq is divided into fourteen main administrative districts, or *liwas*. These are the *liwas* of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Diala, Baghdad, Kut, Dulaim, Hilla, Kerbela, Diwaniya, Muntafiq, Amara, and Basra. Each *liwa* is administered by a *mutasarrif*, who is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior but is also the agent and representative of the other ministries.

Armed Forces and Police

The Iraqi army has an establishment of three divisions, comprising one mountain division, one plains division, and a cadre division which includes a mechanized force. There are a cadet and staff college and the usual service training schools. Military training is compulsory in Iraq for all men between 18 and 25, the period of actual service being 1½–2 years. Students of the secondary, technical, and religious schools are exempt, and exemption may in any case be bought after three months' training by a payment of ID50. Iraq has a small but efficient and expanding air force equipped with British operational aircraft. A flying training college has recently been established.

The police force, with a total strength of over 20,000, has a militarized force of 5,000 including a mechanized regiment, and a small camel corps which patrols the deserts in co-operation with armoured cars.

Public Health

Malaria, enteric fever, bilharzia, amoebic and bacillary dysentery, tuberculosis, ankylostomiasis, venereal diseases, and

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probably at the instigation of the Agha, because he was held to have corrupted the morals of the youth. 609

Health services need not concern us. In the area studied 758
there is no resident doctor outside the city of Erbil.

Iraq
The Government have made various experiments in agricultural 635
reform chiefly with a view to improving the breed of livestock and the
quality of valuable crops such as tobacco. The Government's interest K
in the improvement of the tobacco crop is especially relevant to the 249
area here described. Details will be discussed later but it may be
pointed out that Government assistance of this kind is not a
philanthropic enterprise. The heavy excise duty levied on all
saleable tobacco much more than repays any expenses incurred.

Iraq
The independent judiciary functions through its court in 635
Erbil. In practice however it is in the nature of appeal court, 692
since in the first instance cases come before the Mudir (sub-district
magistrate) and then before the Qa'im Maqam (district magistrate)
before being referred to the court. I am not clear as to the rules
governing "appeal" of this court, nor as to the limits of sentence that
can be imposed by the magistrates' courts. So far as I know, only
serious cases such as homicide automatically go before the court at
Erbil.

During time of peace the military are stationed only at Erbil 635
and Rowanduz. There appears to be a general attitude of suspicion 701
and conflict as between the civil and the military authorities. In K
this area the civil service is staffed mainly by Kurds and Turks and 578
is thus in general inclination Kurdo-phil. The army on the other
hand is staffed mainly by Iraqi-Arabs whose hatred and fear of the
"barbarous Kurd" can be taken for granted.

Iraq
The liwa is divided into several districts (khaza) each 635
presided over by a district magistrate (Qa'im Maqam). Area A, Map 1
with which this account is mainly concerned lies wholly within the
khaza of Rowanduz. The Qa'im Maqam is responsible for his district
in much the same way as the Mutasarrif is responsible for his liwa.

The khaza in turn is subdivided into several sub-districts
(nahiya) over which presides a Mudir. The Balik tribe all reside
within the nahiya Balik - the administrative district in this case
coinciding with the tribal one. Dargala on the other hand is
administered from Rowanduz.

The Mudir has in his direct control a number of policemen who
provide the direct liaison between the external authority and the Iraq
tribe. It is the venality of these junior officials which is the 635
worst feature of the system, and which is the real source of 625

16: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MAI Iran
Kurd MAII
Iraq MHI

Iraq
695
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Government unpopularity among the tribes. May describes the gendarmerie of his time as "hardened ruffians without training and without principles; they used their authority to commit innumerable extortions". It does not appear that the position is much changed today.

"Below the Mudir there should be in each village a Mukhtar, his functions being basically those of registrar and tax collector. Among the hill Kurds the Mukhtar is invariably the Agha of the village concerned and the term is little used.

This summarises briefly the normal functions of the various elements of Government within the area under discussion. A more dynamic view of the interaction between Government and tribe will emerge in the course of what follows.

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* Iraq has had conscription since Turkish times and nominally all Kurds are liable for military service. It is part of the duties of the Mukhtar to record births and report to the Mudir the names of those liable for service. Until very recently however no real records have been kept, so to avoid military service it was merely necessary to produce suitable presents for the right people at the right moment. Contrarywise military service provides the Agha with a convenient means of getting rid of undesirable characters. That at least summarises the position as outlined to me by my interpreter. But I obtained no figures as to the actual numbers conscripted.